Did Aguinaldo Sell the Revolution to Spain?

Not a few uninformed, if not biased, individuals including some historians accuse Aguinaldo of having sold the revolution to Spain. Most likely, these detractors refer to the Biak-na-Bato Peace Pact which was an agreement between the revolutionaries and the Spanish government for the cessation of hostilities, in exchange for the surrender of arms, amnesty to the rebels, and payment of a huge sum of money in favor of the rebels.  The truth is President Aguinaldo and sixty leaders of the revolution met and carefully considered the proposal for a cessation of hostilities in order to have a respite in the fighting and create a war fund, and the Supreme Council of the government at Biak-na-Bato approved it unconditionally.

After President Aguinaldo left Cavite to establish his headquarters at Biak-na-Bato, the focus of the Spaniards shifted from the province of Cavite to the other provinces, with its center in Bulacan.  As General Aguinaldo passed through the rebel zones north of Cavite the local commanders submitted to his authority.  By the time he reached Biak-na-Bato the revolutionists were organized under a single political leadership and military command. After being repulsed in several engagements, more recently his defeat at the battle of Mt. Puray, Governor Primo de Rivera realized the impossibility of crushing the revolution by force of arms. "I can take Biak na Bato", he said to the Spanish Cortes. "Any man can take it. but I cannot answer that I could crush the rebellion." (Gregorio and Sonia Zaide, 118)

This statement, tantamount to an admission of failure, was not new.  The previous Governor-General, Camilo de Polavieja, who was responsible for Dr. Jose Rizal's execution and for crushing the rebellion in Cavite had warned the Spanish government  before he returned to Spain that: "Cavite is the scandal, but Bulacan is the danger." (Zaide, 155) The Spaniards realized that military option alone to suppress the rebellion would be too costly and results uncertain and decided that a negotiated peace was a more desirable option (Corpuz, 133).

In short, both sides needed the respite from the conflict that was draining them both of lives and resources but both were naturally unwilling to admit their own agendas behind agreeing to the truce. The Filipinos needed the money to purchase modern rifles that would even the odds on the battlefield and the Spaniards needed to show their government that they had successfully quelled the Tagalog Revolt.

Here's how the peace agreement was negotiated and agreed upon.

The initiative for the peace negotiation was undertaken by Pedro Paterno who attended a meeting with the Governor-General at Malacanang on August 1, 1897. His idea of a peace settlement was received favorably by the Governor-General who at once reported it to the Prime Minister of Spain. On August 4, Paterno was issued a pass to cross Spanish lines and he proceeded to Biak-na-Bato arriving at the headquarters of President Emilio Aguinaldo on August 9. (Corpuz, 144)

President Aguinaldo told Paterno that no agreement was possible unless all the leaders of the revolution including those in the field were agreeable. So, Paterno travelled to Morong, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan , Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Infanta, Albay and Camarines and met with Vito Belarmino, Pantaleon Garcia, Pascual Alvarez, Doroteo Lopez, Perez Gil Manikis, Salvador Estrella, Mariano Noriel, Artemio Ricarte, Benito Natividad, Esteban Viola, Jose Alejandrino, and Anastacio Francisco. He had to go to Biak-na-bato four times to accomplish his mission (Corpuz, 145).

On September 27, 1897, leaders of the revolution met at Biak-na-Bato and a strange event occurred. An oath was taken by the revolutionary leaders and signed in the presence of President Emilio Aguinaldo, to wit: (1) "For the increase and strengthening of the resources of Government we promise to add to the same our private fortunes", (2) "We will also turn over to the Government Treasury all taxes which we may collect in any town or village", and, (3) "We will not have the power to dispose of said funds without the knowledge and authorization of the President." The document further says that violation of the oath would mean a penalty of one or two gunshots in the breast until the violator is dead. (Taylor, 1:369)

Aguinaldo asserted in his account of the insurrection that there was an agreement drawn up by the insurgents in Biak-na-Bato to the effect that in case the Spaniards did not comply with the stipulations the money paid as an indemnity would not be divided, but would be set aside to purchase arms to renew the war. (Taylor, 1:86) There is no evidence to the effect that such was the agreement among the leaders. However, the above oath gives no other conclusion but the fact that the leaders agreed to create a trust fund, and the money expected from the Spanish government in exchange for the cessation of hostilities would be placed in the fund. While the oath did not specifically mention the Biak-na-Bato money, perhaps due to the need to maintain secrecy, especially outside of the circle of the leaders of the revolution, it is very clear that a trust fund had been established for the benefit of the revolution that could not be touched without the knowledge of and authorization by Aguinaldo.

Apparently, a peace agreement was agreeable to the leaders of the revolution because among the items Taylor had in his Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) is an undated document entitled "Draft of Agreement of Biak-na-Bato" signed by President Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Mamerto Natividad. (Taylor, 1:359-61; Corpuz, 145)

The inclination of the leaders of the revolution towards peace must have been the result of the recent reversals. Aguinaldo had exhausted his resources during the March and April Spanish offensive to retake the province of Cavite. And now, at Biak-na-Bato, they were left with meager supply to continue fighting, holed up in a secluded area far from the sources of food and other provisions with a reduced fighting force. The leaders of the revolution must have seen the offer of peace as an attractive opportunity to buy time, reorganize and create a war fund. 

In his letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt, General Jose Alejandrino said:

"In case peace is accepted it will only be for the money involved which we propose to use for the purpose of promoting immediately another decisive revolution." (Alejandrino, 78)

Accordingly, On November 15 the formal agreement was signed in Malacanang by Primo de Rivera and Paterno, the latter on behalf of President Aguinaldo under the title "Arbitrator" (Corpuz, 146)

Aguinaldo called a meeting of the leaders of the revolution at Biak-na-Bato on December 14, 1897, about sixty of them all, to confirm their acceptance of the proposal of Paterno and the draft agreement he, Natividad, and Llanera had signed. The leaders gave the Supreme Council the authority to act on the proposal. In the meeting of the council composed of President, Emilio Aguinaldo; Vice-President, Mariano Trias; Secretary of Interior, Isabelo Artacho; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Montenegro; of war, Emiliano Riego de Dios; of the Treasury, Baldomero Aguinaldo; Sub-secretary of the Interior, Lino Viola; of war, Vito Belarmino, and of Treasury, Paciano Rizal the peace agreement was approved unconditionally, with objections from Paciano Rizal and Malvar who wished the war should continue. (Taylor, 1:422 and 444)

The Spanish government committed to pay 1,700,000 Mexican dollars to the revolutionists in consideration for the surrender of arms in exchange for amnesty and the institution of specific reforms. Of the total amount, 400,000 Mexican dollars were paid in Hong Kong to Aguinaldo who went on exile together with eighteen other leaders, and 200,000 to the local leaders who stayed behind. The balance was never paid because both parties repudiated the agreement and the revolution entered a new stage.

President Aguinaldo issued the pacification order on December 16. All but a few like Isidoro Torres (Taylor, 1:417) and Francisco Macabulos obeyed Aguinaldo’s order and surrendered themselves and their men to the Spanish authorities together with their arms. Macabulos eventually surrendered and was included in the distribution of the 2nd installment of 200,000 pesos to various stay-behind leaders of the revolution. Of the 14,000 pesos, he received he distributed 8,000 to his men, and the rest he kept for himself. (Taylor, 1:430)

At past noon on December 25, Aguinaldo and eighteen leaders of the revolution left Biak-na-Bato on their way to Dagupan then to Sual where the steamer "Uranus" was waiting. They boarded at 3 o'clock on December 29, with them were Paterno and Col. Miguel Primo de Rivera, who was acting as security for the personal safety of the exiles and for compliance with the first payment. (Corpuz, 147)

Governor-General Primo de Rivera did not tell the whole truth about the agreement to his superiors. In his December 12, 1897 letter to the President of the Council of Ministers of Spain, he said that the leaders of the revolution offered themselves to surrender with only the condition that their lives be spared and that they should be given means to emigrate (Foreman, 562).

Rivera did not mention, in addition to the commitment to pay war compensation, the specific reforms promised which were itemized in the draft agreement that Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Natividad signed. In the final agreement signed by Rivera and Paterno, as representative of Aguinaldo, the reference to reforms was not included. (Taylor, 1:359-64 and 1:401-4) It is not known whether or not Paterno was authorized by Aguinaldo to remove the provisions on reforms or he acted on his own without authority. In any case, the peace agreement was a moral victory for President Aguinaldo and the leaders of the revolution because it provided them the respite needed from the exhaustive war, raised for them a war fund, and, in effect a recognition by the Spanish government of the status of belligerency of the revolutionary government and President Aguinaldo being considered an equal in the negotiation for peace despite the efforts of the Spaniards to masquerade the true character of the event.

In conclusion, an American officer had this to say of the peace agreement: "Instead of dividing the money they had received from General Primo de Rivera among themselves, or paying the indemnity to the families that had suffered, they turned the whole sum into a War Fund for future use." (Blunt, 140)

SOURCES:

1.  Alejandrino, Jose General, "The Price of Freedom" (La Senda del Sacrificio) translated into English by Atty.  Jose M. Alejandrino, Manila, 1949;

2. Bell, Ronald Kenneth: "The Filipino Junta in Hongkong, 1898-1903: History of a Revolutionary Organization", San Diego State University, 1974;

3. Blunt, Captain John Young Mason: "An Army Officer's Philippine Studies", Manila, P.I., University Press, 1912, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AKK9717.0001.001

4. Corpuz, Onofre D.: "Saga and Triumph", University of the Philippines Press, 2002;

5. Foreman, John: "The Philippines", Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1980, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAQ5315.0001.001

6. Zaide, Gregorio and Sonia: "Philippine History and Government", National Bookstore, 1984); and

7. Zaide, Gregorio: "The Philippine Revolution", The Modern Book Company, Manila, 1968.

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