Aguinaldo in history

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Aguinaldo is the emancipator of the Filipino people, the founder of the first Filipino state that defined the identity of all the inhabitants of these islands as Filipino citizens of a republic (no longer as “Indios” or “naturales”), and the initiator for the recognition of this nascent Filipino state by independent nations of the world. This fact is not clear, albeit misunderstood by most Filipinos because of miseducation and outright lies and propaganda proffered by interest groups.

The Rise and Fall of Cavite

Aguinaldo provided the first Filipino victory of the revolution at the battle of Imus. (Ronquillo, 287-297) Had the Cavitenos been defeated by General Aguirre it is almost certain that the nascent rebellion would have been quickly crushed. Instead, by inflicting a crushing defeat upon Aguirre and the Spanish forces, Aguinaldo catapulted revolutionary morale to new heights, induced Governor-General Blanco into taking a more cautious strategy of waiting till he had sufficient troops before daring to venture into Cavite again in November 1896 at Binacayan where Aguinaldo handed him a humiliating defeat (Ronquillo, 345-358) thereby buying time for the Cavitenos and other revolutionaries to consolidate their wins and secure their territories from isolated Spanish garrisons, all of which of course raised Aguinaldo's fame and prestige and secured for him a place of leadership among the revolutionary commanders.

With these victories, he liberated the province of Cavite which became the refuge for besieged Katipuneros from nearby provinces. And in an expression of gratitude and recognition of his leadership, he was elected president of the revolutionary government at Tejeros. However, internal squabbles and the intransigence of Bonifacio in refusing to merge forces under a unified command and at times his reluctance to provide aid to Aguinaldo in the face of the massive Spanish offensive (Saulo, 140-141) contributed to the untimely fall of Cavite. 

Aguinaldo saved the revolution and turned defeat into a stalemate by forcing the Spaniards to sue for peace at Biak-na-Bato.  The agreement provided respite for the battle-weary revolutionaries and shielded them from bodily harm and reprisal while obtaining a promise of long-sought reforms and a huge sum of money in exchange for the surrender of the arms and exile of the leaders abroad.

Decisive Victory Over the Spaniards

The second phase of the revolution commenced upon the return of Aguinaldo in May 1898 from Hong Kong, and immediately he took to the task of organizing an army and supplying it with weapons purchased abroad out of the funds secured from the peace pact of Biak-na-Bato. Through foresight and audacity, he raised the level of revolutionary thrust by building a modern army with better weapons and in the process defeated the Spanish army, leading to the establishment of the first Filipino state, represented by the first Philippine republic that administered Luzon and various islands in the Visayas and some parts of Mindanao, excepting the city of Manila and isolated garrisons. In less than two months, Aguinaldo and his forces conquered practically the whole of Luzon. He surrounded the city of Manila with his forces, sent Gov. Gen. Basilio Agustin a demand to surrender and laid a siege awaiting Agustin’s reply. He set his sights on the Visayan islands and Mindanao, sending expeditionary forces to help local revolutionaries take control of their territory.

Here’s an American eyewitness account of Aguinaldo’s arrival at Cavite:

“As I accompanied him from Hong Kong and was able to be of some service to him, I was received at his headquarters with great cordiality until after the arrival of the first detachment of troops. Admiral Dewey put him to shore in Cavite, gave him a great deal of ammunition and a few cannon, and he started to work. His campaign was wonderful and Admiral Dewey was greatly pleased. Aguinaldo took possession of one of the abandoned houses in Cavite, and at first he acted with great good judgment and simplicity. In a day or two the natives flocked into Cavite in droves, and as a small steamer arrived from Hong Kong, laden with arms and ammunition, in a week there were more than 1,000 men ready to take the field against the Spaniards in Cavite province.” (Stickney, 278)

Felipe Buencamino, a Colonel in the Spanish army, in command of a regiment of militias observed the movements of the rebel army while he was on detention in Aguinaldo’s camp after a failed mission on orders of Spanish Governor-General Basilio Agustin to convince Aguinaldo to fight alongside Spain against the Americans. And he had this to say in his letter to Agustin, urging the Governor-General to surrender: 

“… Having been sent back to my prison, …I could see … the passing of wagons laden with arms, cannon, and ammunition, which would go to the landing and unloaded on cascos, small and large craft which came every day to this city with large masses of men whom I estimate would amount to more than four thousand. Vessels loaded with arms, ammunition and former insurgents would also come from Hongkong and afterward, I learned from those who visited me, after I was released from solitary confinement, that on the 28th of last month a column of three-hundred men of the Marine Infantry, commanded by Major Pazos, was captured between Imus and Kavite Viejo, and at the same time firing was heard on all sides of this province, which showed the general movement of the new revolution.

“I also learned that General Pena with his staff surrendered without exchanging a shot; surrendering cannon and other arms, public and Government treasure, with 200 volunteers from Apalit recruited by me, but which General Monet delivered to the Army Captain, Don Jesus Roldan. The news also came to me that the detachment of Bacoor composed of 200 volunteers from my regiment and over one-hundred men of the Marine Infantry, in command of Lieutenant Colonel, Don Luciano Toledo, having been besieged, … had to surrender; as did also the detachment of Baccor on the following day.

“And thus, in less than six successive days, the detachments of Imus, Binakayan, Noveleta, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Rosario, Salinas, Kavite Viejo and other pueblos of this province which is now in the power of Don Emilio Aguinaldo surrendered.

“But that is not all because there also came as prisoners from Kalamba, Binan, Muntinlupa and from the province of Bataan - among them the Governor and Administrator with their wives and daughters - 200 volunteers of the Blanco Regiment with its captain, Gomez, and 4 officers, besides 170 Cazadores with Lieutenant Colonel Baquero. Colonel Francia escaped to Pampanga, leaving the volunteers.

“In a word: in eight days of operations, Don Emilio Aguinaldo has, here and in the conquered pueblos, 2,500 prisoners and more than five thousand arms, 8 cannon and a large number of friars, which has decided him to direct an attack on Manila, in combination with his forces from Bulacan, from this province, and those from that capital, which will amount to some thirty-thousand men armed with rifles and cannon; sending his forces from Bataan and Nueva Ecija to surround General Monet’s, who is in Pampanga, and those of Paciano Rizal in Kalamba to invade Batangas. (Taylor, v3:92-97)

Buencamino's account of Aguinaldo’s victory over the Spanish army is confirmed by U.S. General Thomas Anderson in this interview published in the North American Review of February 1900, viz:

"At that time [July 1898] the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defenses of Manila and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field, and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that they ' had the morale on them.' The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time and so incomplete was their line of defense that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a de facto government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and, it would, therefore, have been practically under Filipino control. (Philippine Information Society, 7-8)

This is the first known achievement of an Asiatic people toppling down a western power. But the Spaniards did not go down in defeat before their former subjects technically because the mixed-up situation gave them a way out of their predicament by surrendering themselves not to Aguinaldo but to the Americans after a sham battle and in the process, the honor of Spain was saved.

As soon as the republic was formed, Aguinaldo organized the first foreign diplomatic corp and sent emissaries and envoys like Felipe Agoncillo, Galicano Apacible, Mariano Ponce, Jose Sixto Lopez, Heriberto Zarcal, and Jose Alejandrino to the United States, Europe, and Japan to make known to the world about the existence of the newly established Filipino republic and obtain its recognition. 

This is the first-ever sovereign act of the natives of the Philippine islands heretofore known as “Indios” -  Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Kapampangans, Bicols, Visayans, etc. – liberating themselves from the downtrodden status of slaves or subjects of the Spanish crown for more than 300 years, arrogating for themselves the new title of Filipino citizens of the newly established republic, the first republic in Asia, and expressing their desire to be free and independent through their representatives in a duly constituted assembly that promulgated the first constitution of the Filipino people, otherwise known as the Malolos constitution. This is the greatest achievement of the Filipino people that has not been surpassed to this date; this period is the golden age in their history.  

However, the expansionist policy of the McKinley administration and later by Roosevelt foretold the collapse of the first Philippine republic.

Thus, on February 4, 1899, the third phase of the Philippine revolution broke out, this time against the United States whose policy is that of the annexation of the Philippine islands, throwing aside the purported alliance with the Filipinos against Spain and withholding recognition of the sovereign rights of the Aguinaldo government. The war lasted for more than three years. Here is the summary by an observer:

"...126,500 Americans saw service in the Philippine Insurrection, the peak strength of the American army at any single time was 70,000, and this army suffered battle losses of over 4,200 men killed and over 2,800 wounded. This represented a casualty rate of 5.5 percent, one of the highest of any war in American history. The financial cost of the war was over $400 million, a figure 20 times the purchase price paid to Spain. The insurgents suffered battle losses of 16,000-20,000 killed. In addition, perhaps 200,000 Filipinos died of famine, disease, and other war-related calamities. (Welch, 42)

The tenacity of the Filipinos in keeping the Americans busy for such a long period may be traced to the generous support that the civilian population provided to the Filipino Republican Army. U.S. General Arthur MacArthur took note of this important aspect of the war in a statement made to an American war correspondent and published in the New York Criterion of June 17, 1889, viz:

"When I first started in against these rebels I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a fraction... I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon... was opposed to us, but having come thus far, and having been brought much in contact with both insurgents and amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he leads.” (Blount, 24)

Why is Aguinaldo being Maligned? 

Today, Aguinaldo’s image is stained with false accusations, foremost of which are allegations of hunger for power, complicity in the death of two heroes, and as an enemy collaborator. Why would a man of heroic and grandiose achievement end up maligned, insulted, and disrespected by the very people he had served?

The root cause of this anomaly may be traced to the archives of the United States Congress in the records of committee hearings giving light to the fact that after American authority was firmly established in the islands in early 1900, and the Aguinaldo-led resistance against the superior American war machine was put down, Admiral Dewey and other U.S. military and consular officials testified before the U.S. Congress that there was no alliance with the Filipinos against Spain - “No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of independence made to him then … ” (Alger, 359)

No alliance of any kind? Let us get down to the facts.  The Americans were the ones who sought Aguinaldo’s cooperation in fighting the Spaniards in the Philippines. As early as March 1898, the Filipino Junta in Hongkong was electrified when Captain Wood, Commander of U.S.S. Petrel, acting on behalf of Commodore Dewey, conferred with Aguinaldo, urging him to return to the Philippines to lead once more the revolution against Spain, on the assurance that Americans would supply him with the necessary arms. Asked about the policy of the United States following the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Philippines Wood replied that America is a great and rich nation and neither needs nor desires colonies. (Agoncillo, 98)

Another conference occurred the following month at the residence of a Filipino dentist in Singapore named Dr. Isidro Santos who was pressed by Howard Bray, a long time resident of the Philippines, to have U.S. Consul Spencer Pratt talk to Aguinaldo who had slipped into the city incognito accompanied by Gregorio del Pilar and Jose Leyva to escape the Arcadio suit in Hong Kong. In this meeting that was also attended by Bray, del Pilar, and Leyva, Consul Pratt told Aguinaldo: “Spain and America have been at war. Now is the time for you to strike. Ally yourselves with America and you will surely defeat the Spaniards.”  (Ibid, 99)

While Aguinaldo was in Singapore, two members of the Hongkong Junta, Messrs. Jose Alejandrino, and Andres Garchitorena conferred in French with Admiral Dewey on board the “Olympia” with Lieut. Brumby of the Signal Corp acting as interpreter, and the Admiral was quoted as saying:

“The American people, champion of liberty, will undertake this war with the humanitarian purpose of liberating from the Spanish yoke the people which are under it and to give them independence and liberty, as we have already proclaimed before the whole world.  … America is rich under all concepts; it has territories scarcely populated, aside from the fact that our constitution does not permit us to expand territorially outside of America.  For these reasons, the Filipinos can be sure of their independence and of the fact that they will not be despoiled of any piece of their territory.” (Alejandrino, 89-90)

A final meeting happened in Hong Kong with U.S. Consul, Rounseville Wildman, who proposed to Aguinaldo to establish a dictatorial government to prosecute the war and was even entrusted by Aguinaldo with the money to purchase 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. (Ibid, 102). And of course, Aguinaldo and his associates were conveyed from Hong Kong to Cavite by U.S. gunboats. 

The denial by the U.S. military and Consular officials there was an alliance with the Filipinos is like saying that Aguinaldo was a liar and his claim that he had a conference with the Admiral on board the “Olympia” upon arrival in Cavite where he received assurance from the Admiral of support for Philippine independence (Aguinaldo, 16) was a figment of Aguinaldo’s confused mind.

Why did the Americans deny any alliance with Aguinaldo?  

Admitting the existence of an alliance would put the Americans in a bad light because it would show that they double-talked and hoodwinked Aguinaldo into fighting their war and trashed him aside to claim for themselves the victory over the Spaniards, and then when the land forces have arrived they turned against him and suppressed his resistance.  This scenario was clearly expressed by Col.  James Russell Codman:

"It is an undeniable fact, proved by unquestionable evidence, accessible to any citizen who will take the pains to obtain it, that Aguinaldo's assistance in the war with Spain was solicited by United States officials; that he and his friends were used as allies by the American naval and military commanders; that, until after the capture of Manila, to which they contributed, they were allowed to believe that the independence of the Philippine Islands would be recognized by the American government; and that it was not until after the American forces in the islands had been made strong enough to be able - as was supposed - to conquer the Islanders, that the mask was thrown off. Independence was then refused them, and the purpose of the president to extend the sovereignty of the United States over them by military force was openly proclaimed. That the Filipinos resisted, and that they took up arms against foreign rule, was something that ought to have been expected; for it is exactly what Americans would have done." (Codman, 1) 

The fact is, the conquest of the Philippine Islands by the United States was criminal aggression, using U.S. Pres. McKinley's own words quoting from his speech before the U.S. Senate as he urged for the declaration of war against Spain, viz: “I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression” (Storey, vi and 74). Indeed, McKinley said it very clear that the American conquest of the Philippines was criminal aggression because “… the United States … establish its dominion by suppressing an indigenous revolution, ignoring a declaration of independence as a meaningful act of sovereignty, and overthrowing a representatively convened national assembly.” (Bankoff, 181)

Yes, the Americans came as invaders.  Their claim on the islands that is anchored on the Treaty of Paris was defective because according to Mabini the treaty was null and void. Spain had lost its right to cede the islands having been divested of its claim to sovereignty and authority after its defeat and surrender  (Taylor, 4:64-6). If there was any negotiation as to the future of the islands it should have been between the Americans and the Filipinos who controlled and administered most of the territory outside the city of Manila, the only territory held by the Americans at the time. Therefore, it is safe to declare that the exclusion of the Filipinos from the treaty conference and being barred from participating in the negotiations was a deliberate American design to keep the Filipinos under wraps in consonance with McKinley’s imperialistic policy.

Maligning Aguinaldo - American Era

Given the background of Aguinaldo's relationship with the Americans, it was necessary to present him as a liar motivated by a personal interest in the pursuit of the war against the Spaniards.  If Aguinaldo is looked upon as a liar, more so as a traitor, he would become unworthy of respect or sympathy by his compatriots, and naturally, everything else associated with him especially his patriotic stand against the Americans would be looked upon with disbelief or skepticism.

From this American position proceeded the deliberate act of muddling the historical accounts of the Filipino-American war and camouflaging the American conquest of the Philippines as a humanitarian mission in line with the policy of “benevolent assimilation”, viz: 

(1) the Filipinos were tagged as the initiator of the war but the truth is it was the Americans who crossed into Filipino lines and fired the first shot;

(2) the war was stripped of its rightful importance and conveniently tucked under the caption, “The Spanish-American War";

(3) the war was not included in the official list of wars fought by the United States in the 19th or 20^th century;

(4) the war was labeled “insurrection”, promoting the legal claim of the United States under the Treaty of Paris and pre-empting the sovereign rights of the Aguinaldo government;

(5) voluminous records and war relics captured during the conflict were shipped to the United States and stowed away from the reach of ordinary Filipinos, except to those historians given access by the U.S. military;

(6) the Sedition Act was passed that was effective for 12 years which criminalized the display of the Filipino flag, any public gathering, or speech or writing that had a patriotic theme; 

(7) A public school system was established to teach American history, culture, arts, songs, literature, and heroes that molded a new Filipino who is detached from his inherent intellect and knowledge and made him love America more than his own country; and,

(8) Aguinaldo was branded a traitor to his people for agreeing to the Biak-na-Bato peace pact and for taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. 

Among the early publications that pictured Aguinaldo negatively is the one by Murat Halstead (1829-1908), which, just by reading the title, gives the impression that what is inside is part of a grand conspiracy to besmirch the image of Aguinaldo. The title reads: “The politics of the Philippines: Aguinaldo a traitor to the Filipinos and a conspirator against the United States; the record of his transformation from a beggar to a tyrant.”

Aguinaldo himself expressed his disenchantment at one time when he said:

"I have been loyal to America and the Americans. I have at all times acted upon their advice, complied with their desires, yet in their daily journals they endevour to humiliate me before my people. They call me thief, renegade, traitor, for no reason. I have done them no harm; I have assisted them to their ends, and they now consider me their enemy. Why am I called a renegade, traitor, thief?" (Sheridan, 90)

Paradoxically, we see today a memorial in honor of McKinley. Why should the Filipinos dignify this hypocrite by naming after him a major thoroughfare that runs through the most expensive piece of real estate in the country terminating at the beautiful park in the plush commercial center in Taguig? Either Filipinos are gullible or they are ignorant of their history.

Maligning Aguinaldo - Quezon era

Enter Manuel L. Quezon.  During the revolution against Spain Quezon served in the Manila Batallion of the Spanish army; his father  Lucio similarly took the side of the Spaniards, helped the beleaguered Spanish soldiers holed up in the church of Baler, was captured and killed by the revolutionaries  (Javar, 14).  Quezon joined the Filipino Republican army after Spain surrendered.  With the collapse of the First Philippine Republic, he concentrated on politics and became friends with Americans like Harry  Brandholtz, James G. Harbord, and General Douglas MacArthur. His rise in the Philippine political scene was phenomenal and it was not implausible that he would cross paths with Aguinaldo who was still considered the “El Caudillo” and hero for having led the revolution against Spain and the resistance against the Americans.

Here is how Quezon was viewed as a politician:

". . . Quezon was ingratiating and charismatic, a brilliant orator and a consummate politician. He was audacious, resourceful, unencumbered by integrity, and capable of shrewdly using his political strengths to mold public opinion. His assessments of those with whom he dealt were unerring. He manipulated where he could – Filipinos and Americans alike – and used the electoral process to bludgeon those Filipinos who challenged him. He equated political opposition with enmity and was ruthless in dealing with influential Filipinos who were loyal to rival leadership or to abstract ideas that incurred his ire. These qualities were moderated only by the transfer to himself of the loyalty of Filipinos buffeted by his combativeness or their withdrawal from the arena of insular politics." (Golay, 166)

Quezon and Aguinaldo did not see eye to eye. As soon as Quezon came home from his mission to the United States and reported that he was also considering two alternatives to independence that were not necessarily full, immediate, and absolute as originally agreed upon by the independence committee, Aguinaldo accused him of being a traitor to the Filipino cause. (Golay, 297). 

Did Quezon really want independence?  Here is the answer of a critic: "The answer is no... Quezon wanted to become the chief executive of a government ran by Filipinos and protected by a benevolent American people in exchange for which certain rights and privileges would be granted to the United States and Americans."  (Onorato, 229)  This kind of arrangement would become a reality in the form of military bases and parity rights agreements that were signed after 1946.

And in Quezon’s conflict with Governor Leonard Wood, Aguinaldo took the opposite side. Whether these personal differences influenced a belligerent response from Quezon is not clear at this time. But the involvement of certain personalities associated with Quezon in incidents that dragged Aguinaldo’s name to controversies would lead to the suspicion that indeed the active hand of Quezon was very much involved.

As early as 1917, Guillermo Masangkay, an associate of Supremo of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, and later identified with Quezon, led a party to locate and exhume the remains of the Supremo in Cavite and had these identified by Bonifacio’s sister and proclaimed authentic by the National Museum Director, Epifanio Delos Santos. (Santos, 178-183) The alleged bones were paraded around the city of Manila and placed in a beautiful glassed container and displayed in the National Museum. Of course, the effect of this was to elicit sympathy for Bonifacio and anger at those responsible, and the finger pointed to Aguinaldo for his alleged role and complicity.

This was followed by a statement issued in 1930 by a former General in Aguinaldo’s army, Pantaleon Garcia, who had become the Sargeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate of which Quezon was president, to the effect that he was allegedly given instructions by Aguinaldo to kill General Antonio Luna, which he was unable to do on account of his sickness at the time. (Pantaleon Garcia, 22)

Also, a certain Antonio Bautista, erstwhile campaign manager of Aguinaldo in Bulacan, abruptly switched to Quezon camp and orchestrated the circulation of a story billed as "pagluluksa sa Malolos" (mourning in Malolos), in which it was alleged that the townspeople of Malolos hang black drapes and closed their windows when Aguinaldo arrived (Veneracion, 249).

The attack on Aguinaldo was not confined to politics. He was also subjected to harassment economically and financially. The annual pension of P12,000 granted to him under Philippine Legislature Act No. 2922 which was approved on March 20, 1920, was stopped by the express repeal by Commonwealth Act No. 288 under the Quezon administration in 1939.  Also, Eulogio Rodriguez, then the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the cabinet of Quezon summarily stripped Aguinaldo of all but 344 hectares of landholdings on the basis that he failed to make good the payment of installments due on the loan he obtained from the government for the acquisition of the friar estate in Cavite. (Ara, 169)

So, for those with the critical eye, they will not fail to notice that three major thoroughfares in Quezon City that intersect each other are named after Manuel L. Quezon (the Quezon Avenue), Epifanio Delos Santos (the EDSA), and Eulogio Rodriguez (the E. Rodriguez Avenue). Is this a pure coincidence or is it to immortalize the significant roles played together by the three personalities in history?

Under the atmosphere at the time, it would not be difficult to add to the “sins” of Aguinaldo the alleged sell-out of the revolution at Biak-na-Bato, the alleged malversation of the peace agreement money, his alleged complicity in the death of General Antonio Luna, and the blame for the failure of the revolution. But true or not the desired result was accomplished - Aguinaldo was transformed from hero to villain. Therefore, it seemed logical to conclude that Aguinaldo’s defeat in the 1935 election for the presidency of the Commonwealth was not really because Quezon was popular than Aguinaldo but rather the result of the campaign to malign Aguinaldo in the eyes of his people.

Maligning Aguinaldo - Japanese Occupation

The second world war added to the denigration of the public image of Aguinaldo. When the Japanese-sponsored 2nd Philippine republic was inaugurated with Jose P. Laurel as president, Aguinaldo considered it the realization of his dream. He believed the Japanese were more sympathetic to the Filipino aspirations for freedom because in less than three years a Filipino republic was established while the Americans required a 10-year Commonwealth period to determine if absolute independence would be granted. Perhaps this belief was anchored on his positive experience with the Japanese who sent advisers and armaments to help the Filipinos during the Filipino-American war. Accordingly, Aguinaldo actively assisted in efforts to end the pacific war in the Philippines soonest in the hope that peace would give the 2nd republic a chance to succeed. But his efforts were construed differently - he was accused of aiding the enemy and tagged as a Japanese collaborator, a label that continues to haunt his memory to this day.

Maligning Aguinaldo - by Leftist Elements

The advent of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Philippines further accentuated the anti-hero syndrome of Aguinaldo’s image.  Sown in the early 1900s the ideology propagated after World War II and took root among nationalist-leaning historians and students and academicians especially in government-funded universities.  The advocates took advantage of the American-era anti-Aguinaldo propaganda to bolster their leftist agenda, i.e., create a revolutionary situation leading towards the overthrow of the existing bourgeois establishment. 

Bonifacio was hijacked to serve as the key component of the configuration.  He is made to represent the rallying symbol of their advocacy because in the structure of their concept Bonifacio personified the masses, while Aguinaldo was the elite, therefore, the enemy.  The two heroes were pitted against each other as a way of reliving the leadership conflict of the revolution  This conflict was made to represent the supposed contemporary and continuing class struggle in the Philippines.  And to make the complex leftist ideology easier for the youthful minds to absorb, the supposed class struggle was hitched to the Bonifacio-Aguinaldo feud of old.  In the process, the revolution of 1896 against Spain led by Bonifacio became the revolution of the leftist even if the ideology was never a factor at the time, and by claiming the revolution was that of the masses, it is effectively juxtapositioned to the present, because by definition, the leftists are the masses.  Thus, for the uninitiated, to be a disciple of Marx and Lenin is actually an act of patriotism and therefore to rebel against the established order is justified in the same manner that Bonifacio’s revolution was.  Of course, this is a pure and simple web of insidious propaganda. 

But apparently, the strategy works.  The theoretical social conflict of masses versus the elite that used to remain aloof in the minds of intellectuals has now gone down to the level of the neophytes. This explains why the incessant noise in social media about Aguinaldo being “hungry for power”, a “traitor”, or “a murderer”, or “coward” is coming from the younger generation who hardly know the history of their country or Aguinaldo’s contribution to nationhood.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, Aguinaldo’s legacies – the national flag, the national anthem, but more importantly, the national aspiration to be free and independent handed down by the architects of the First Philippine Republic, will endure forever, and so will the memory of Aguinaldo. And today, the image of Aguinaldo as a patriot and hero is resurfacing, bolstered by historical facts made accessible by the internet to impartial and objective minds.

In homage to the man, here is Aguinaldo’s role in history, according to Gabriel F. Fabella (Mauro Garcia, 26-27):

(1) Aguinaldo was the first man to make the world conscious of the existence of the Philippines by leading two revolutions against Spain, and a war of defense of their newly established republic against the United States. As a consequence, he is the first Filipino whose name appears in the world encyclopedias.

(2) He helped to weld the Filipinos into a nation through deeds rather than by pen or words;

(3) He was the first man to demonstrate that a Filipino is capable of running an orderly government of his own making;

(4) He set an example of honesty, integrity, and incorruptibility in the government service;left happy memories of the First and Second Republics of the Philippines, and finally,

(5) He bequeathed permanent legacies to our people.

(a) A Philippine independence day

(b) A Filipino flag, and

(c) A national anthem.

SOURCES:

(Credit to Sumaquel Hosalla, Tommy Matic IV, Ryan Aguinaldo, and Jomar Gelvoleo Encila for their contribution in putting together this paper)

Agoncillo, Teodoro: "Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic", University of the Philippines Press, Diliman, Quezon City, 1997.

Aguinaldo, Don Emilio: "True Version of the Philippine Revolution," Tarlak, P.I., 1899, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2298.0001.001

Alger, Russell Alexander, “The Spanish-American War”, New York, London: Harper & Bros., 1901 University of Michigan Library 2005 http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ABZ6565.0001.001.

Alejandrino, Jose, "The Price of Freedom (La Senda del Sacrificio)", Episodes and Anecdotes about our Struggle for Freedom, original in Spanish, by General Jose Alejandrino, translated into English by Atty.  Jose Alejandrino, prologue by Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manila, 1949

Ara, Sastoshi, “Emilio Aguinaldo Under American and Japanese Rule: Submission for Independence?”, Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2015): 169-192, copyright Ateneo de Manila University.

Bankoff, Greg, “A Tale of Two Wars”, Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2002, Vol 81 No. 6, Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 179-181).

Blount, James H.: "The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912," New York, London, G.P. Putnam's Son, 1912, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AHZ9397.1913.001

Codman, Charles Russell: "Why he supports Bryan: Col. Charles R. Codman sets forth his reasons," New York: Anti-Imperialist League of New York, 1901, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ADT4649.0001.001

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